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Organized Labor's Coalition Politics in Hamburg and Seattle
Ian Greer
Why do some unions engage in special interest politics while others pursue broader social goods? In this chapter I examine the effect of global markets for capital and local political mobilization. I argue that protecting jobs requires unions to engage in coalition politics, sometimes in pursuit of social goods that have benefits beyond the interests of union members. In cases, however, of highstakes economic development projects involving large employers, the affected unions join business-driven coalitions with narrowly economistic pro-jobs agen das. I demonstrate this argument by comparing union involvement in the poli tics of economic development in Seattle and Hamburg. Because the argument holds in both Germany and the United States, labors constraints and opportu nities may increasingly have to do less with national differences than with the par ticulars of local politics and labor-business dependence.
LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
As capital has become more global, unions have found that they have to partici pate in local policies to attract and retain "good jobs." This race for capital creates an unfortunate paradox. The globalization of capital and corporate organization leads to a localization or decentralization of collective labor participation. AlMany thanks to participants in seminars at Cornell, the European Trade Union Institute in Brussels, the Forschungsinstitut Arbeit Bildung und Partizipation in Recklinghausen, and the M ax-Planck-In stitut für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIfG) in Cologne for comments on earlier presentations o f this material. Thanks to Barbara Byrd, Virginia Doellgast, Lou Jean Fleron, Marco Hauptmeier, Otto Ja cobi, Nathan Lillie, Nari Rhee, and Lowell Turner for comments on earlier versions o f the chapter. Fi nally, thanks to Cornell University's New York State School o f Industrial and Labor Relations, the Ford Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service, and the MPIfG for financial support o f the field research.
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though trade unionists are caught up in this daily grind to attract, retain, or or ganize jobs in a specific place, their employers and other adversaries are organized on a much broader scale.
"Decentralization" and "localization," however, are vague concepts. Although studies of comparative politics and industrial relations tend to stress the in-plant character of participation (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Turner 1991), worker participation can also extend beyond the workplace into the broader com munity and local politics (Locke 1992). Sometimes unions act as social partners and sometimes as contentious worker representatives. Their goals can be self-in terested and economistic or broad and social.
Case studies can bring some clarity to the matter. In an international com parison of union political participation in two urban regions, Hamburg and Seat tle, I find striking parallels. In the construction and health-care sectors, trade unionists followed a strategy to retain jobs, attract members, and innovate in the provision of broader social goods. For these unions, participation creates oppor tunities with broader implications for the local labor and progressive scenes. Par ticipation, however, also has a dark side. In the aerospace sector, unions were caught up in a high-stakes race for capital investment from a major employer.
Meeting corporate demands involved deep social costs beyond the camp of or ganized labor.
One way to understand patterns of coalition formation is to examine national patterns of labor-management relations. The nationally specific rules governing labor-management relations lead to some differences in how unions participate in the political economy. In the 1980s, researchers on the German labor move A second option is to examine urban development politics and ask how unions work with other locally organized interests to deal with policy issues that affect workers. Businesses and politicians, for example, can be close allies with labor, since they, too, favor economic development. In cities that are hemorrhaging manufacturing jobs, however, this usually involves painful compromises (Savitch and Kantor 2002), and in many younger cities "growth machines" consistently place business promotion above all other policy goals (Logan, Whaley, and Crow- rivalries. Although collective bargaining is formally more centralized in Germany than in the United States, this does not affect the variables that shape union coali tion-building strategies. Comparing cities with similar political cultures, levels of union strength, industry structure, and economic vitality allows a test of the rel ative importance of sectoral and national differences.
HAMBURG
Hamburg, Germany's second largest city, with 1.7 million residents, has a long history as an independent Hanseatic port city (freie Hansestadt) on the Elbe River. The Hansestadt is a city-state within the German federal system, governed by a directly elected city council that elects an executive cabinet (the Senate) and mayor. The city's territory corresponds roughly to its economic space, thanks to a Nazi-era reform annexing the nearby industrial towns of Harburg, Wilhelms burg, and Altona. The region has been a union stronghold from the nineteenth bringing Hamburg into the postindustrial era. In the late 1990s, the local of the metalworkers union, IG Metall, having declined from fifty-six thousand to forty thousand members since the early 1970s, became deeply involved in a push for a new Airbus plant. These initiatives, however, had social and environmental costs and strong local opposition, often within the union camp. This pattern of local participation and coalition politics changed with the de feat of the SPD. Unions, dealing with the same trends, found that they needed a more vocal, public approach. Their most dramatic public display of discontent came when the Senate announced its intention to privatize the public hospitals, the Landesbetrieb Krankenhaeuser (LBK council has a substantial antiunion caucus). IG Metall in Hamburg pursues a strategy of "workplace-near" collective bargaining, in which the regional sectoral agreements, covering Germany's northern coastal regions, are customized in close consultation with the works council to deal with issues specific to the firm.
One agreement at Airbus, for example, is called "Siduflex." It buffers the com pany's core German workforce, including thirteen thousand workers in Ham burg, from the industry's vicissitudes through a series of agreements that cover working time accounts (schemes to pay for time off during business downturns in exchange for unpaid overtime during boom periods), temporary workers, and outsourcing. Siduflex, however, has been hampered by the low degree of union organization in the white-collar areas of the plant. While union density among blue-collar workers keeps overall union density above a quarter, membership among white-collar workers (who outnumber blue-collar workers 2-1 in the plant) has slid from 15 percent to below 10 percent.
Outside the firm, therefore, union participation has proven crucial. In De previous channels of influence. Although Erhard Pumm, the head of the local DGB, retained his seat as an SPD city councilor, he lost his influence in the exec utive branch. The new coalition government of liberals, conservatives, and rightwing populists announced that it would privatize a majority stake in LBK. The hospital privatization fight led to a major test for the newly merged ver.di (which included the old ÖTV) and its leader, Wolfgang Rose. Pumm and Rose responded to hospital privatization by organizing mobilizations of hospital workers and community allies and by shifting the union's role from labor-management-gov ernment partnership to community mobilization.
The Senate had created LBK in 1996 as part of an effort to make public agen cies independent and entrepreneurial. Because LBK accounted for about half of Hamburg's local hospital beds and fifteen thousand employees, rationalizing it had huge implications for economic development and social well-being. That 200 IAN GREER year, the works council and ÖTV negotiated a series of concessions in order to make LBK more efficient, including massive outsourcing of services (cleaning, cooking, transport, maintenance, and information technology), the closure of a hospital, and the elimination of three thousand jobs. In exchange, the union and works council won policies to cushion the impact of downsizing on the work force. This exchange was possible because of the close ties between unionists, managers, and top policymakers in the government, including an affiliation with the SPD shared by all three.
The post-2001 battle over privatization proceeded differently. In principle, Pumm, Rose, and the works council did not want to be "blockers"; they agreed with the government that updating the company's physical infrastructure would require some private financing. Unions and the SPD proposed 49 percent priva tization, to retain local public control o f health care, while obtaining the capital needed for upgrades. CDU health-care and public-financing experts, however, ar gued that private suppliers of capital would not accept a minority stake. Since hospital chains would be assuming the risks, they argued, the purchaser-in this case, for-profit hospital chain Asklepios-would require control and 74 percent ownership. The ballot initiative was, by all accounts, a powerful tool. Conservative party officials said in interviews that the unions had been so successful in "instrumentalizing" popular feelings of insecurity that they had to focus on their mayoral candidate, the photogenic Ole von Beust, rather than controversial policy issues.
For similar reasons, LBK administrators and Asklepios managers kept a low pro file. Although the initiative won over three-quarters approval from the voters, the conservatives won an absolute majority on the city council. LBK and Airbus illustrate changes in the opportunity structure faced by Ham burg's labor movement since the 1990s. At first, labor had allied itself with a so cial democratic government bent on a vigorous economic development program.
Under conservative governments, however, rather than a process of joint prob lem solving, hospital rationalization sparked a battle over privatization and a se ries of mobilizations and coalitions that will probably continue for years to come. This struggle helped to build a nascent local ver.di organization and revive the lo cal DGB. The meaning of participation shifted from mobilizing as the govern ment's junior partner to developing alternative strategies and building a new social coalition. After the 2001 election, unions had a broader menu of options because o f their independence from the government and ver.di's broad scope be yond LBK and the health-care industry.
SEATTLE
Since the mid-1990s Seattle has gained a reputation as a hot spot of union revi talization.2 With relatively high union density, its booming service, transporta tion, and high-tech economy has made it the economic engine of the Pacific Northwest. Like Hamburg, Seattle is an economic development success story, where progrowth politics have succeeded, albeit unevenly and with social costs.
Seattle's trade unionists share many challenges with their colleagues in Hamburg.
A large aircraft manufacturer's strategy of pitting regions against each other forced organized labor into a business-led coalition, sacrificing social goods for economic development. Meanwhile, in other sectors, labor has managed to com bine its interest in job retention with other goals. Efforts by unions to retain union jobs in construction involve new policies to spread the gains from economic de velopment to disadvantaged groups and has facilitated the revitalization of Seat tle's AFL-CIO affiliate, the King County Labor Council (KCLC). Like Hamburg, this renewal has taken place as union membership density has declined (although economic growth and organizing have increased the absolute union membership in the region).
The economic development politics of Seattle has both probusiness and pro gressive elements. The region is highly dependent on Boeing and focused on building up its physical infrastructure. Progressive forces, however, are also firmly entrenched, with powerful environmental and other community organizations.
Compared to Hamburg's SPD, Seattle's Democrats, some o f whom are among the state's most progressive politicians, have a solid base o f support. Organized labor has joined this constellation of forces, after a long period of conservatism. Seat tle Union Now, Jobs with Justice, the Worker Center AFL-CIO, the Boeing strikes, the massive WTO protests, and dozens of smaller, lesser-known campaigns and projects all attest to the ferment of Seattle labor during the 1990s. Since then, the KCLC (along with its state-level equivalent) has revived its member-mobilization program around election campaigns, introduced a new endorsement process, brought pressure to bear on labor-supported candidates, and built broad coali tions that include environmentalists, community groups, and portions of the re gion's business community. Although unions have had success in fusing broader social goods to the politics of construction, winning the high-stakes race for aero space jobs has split the labor movement (though only in the short run) over the costs of development. In the early 1990s, however, the building-trades council switched from this defensive approach to a more proactive coalition-based approach. Reforms in apprenticeship rules and improved community relations were central to this strategy. Judd worked with local community leaders to develop a set of rules gov erning building projects. The purpose was to protect the market share of union contractors and bring women and minorities into the trades. Adding social goals generated broad political support for project labor agreements (PLAs) and brought a stream of funding from the Port of Seattle.
The main policy initiative consisted of rules requiring minimum levels of ap prenticeship utilization and enforceable racial and gender diversity targets. Ini tially, PLAs were instituted at airport expansion projects, and over the following ten years they spread to county and municipal office buildings, mass transit, schools, and new private development. Alongside the PLAs, the building trades supported several programs (mentorship, housing, transportation, preappren ticeship, and so on) to help apprentices both on and off the job, using contribu tions from the port, which also had an interest in spreading the proceeds of development. Despite some disagreements with the building trades over the ad ministration of the programs, the port reported that significant improvements 204 
IAN GREER
had been made in gender and racial diversity. The building trades and KCLC also managed to include other social goods, such as organizing rights and affordable housing, into some of the more controversial projects. By the late 1990s, Scott's group, the Northwest Labor and Employment Law Office (LELO), was helping to frame project labor agreements and taking an active role in monitoring their im plementation.
The spread of PLAs-or more precisely, the apprenticeship rules in themwas a victory for the unions. Other local actors began taking unions seriously as advocates for socially responsible growth. The stabilizing effect came partly from rules stipulating that apprentices had to enroll in state-licensed apprenticeship programs. Unionized programs cover 95 percent of King County's apprentices. Economic development politics, however, have also had a downside for Seat tle's unions. The region's largest employer, Boeing, has forced unions into some extremely difficult political positions. Boeing employs over fifty thousand work ers in design and production facilities, mainly in southern King County and Everett. The company has long dominated local labor markets for skilled blue and white-collar aerospace workers and has found ways to win union support for subsidies and infrastructure investment from state and local governments. Since Boeing became the dominant local employer during World War II, its patterns of hiring and firing have created periods of boom and bust (Markusen, Golob, and Grey 1996). In recent years, Boeing has become increasingly footloose. It has shifted its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago (where it has no production fa cilities) and outsourced and offshored considerable production (including some complex work such as wing production). The company's labor-relations strategy has come to emphasize union busting and downsizing-"reduce union leverage; reduce union workers"3-and it has met several organizing drives with unionbusting tactics. Most important for Seattle's unions, however, was the company's threat to shift assembly work of a new plane, the 7E7, to a greenfield location. with managers, Boeing lobbyists, and other partners to improve Boeing's busi ness climate (winning subsidies, government orders, infrastructure, and other ad vantages); inside the workplace, they have used a partnership approach to win participation rights in work reorganization and outsourcing decisions, in hopes of preventing mismanagement and saving jobs. Union leaders have been largely dissatisfied with the results of in-firm partnership, due to management's ten dency to ignore the advice of joint committees and distance joint activities from the core of strategic decision making. The IAM's training fund, for example, has been used more as a way to help unemployed workers get skills for other jobs than for its stated purpose, to improve quality at Boeing. 
URBAN POLlflCAL ECONOMY AND LABOR'S SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
Unions are searching for alternatives, and, despite their dark side, the politics of local economic development holds some promise for this search. While some unions revive themselves through coalition politics to pursue broad social goods, others end up on an economistic low road. Why do unions pursue these differ ent goods? The observed differences reflect not only differences in union strategy A sectoral explanation stressing the differences between multinational manu facturing and local services leaves a few features of this comparison unexplained. It remains to be explained, for example, why unionists did not utilize the large firm structure as an opportunity, especially the Germany-wide and European works councils. Furthermore, all three sectors are both localized and globalized.
While LBK and Seattle's real estate development industries also depend on su perregional markets for capital, Boeing and Airbus face some local regulation via the influence of local politicians in national policymaking. Industrial, trade, and land-use policies still constrain these aerospace giants, despite their political power and control over the location of jobs. In addition, a focus on sectoral dif ferences neglects changes over time in cities and firms. With a change in local pol itics, Hamburg's unions took a different approach at both Airbus and LBK, and a change in Boeing's fortunes led to a change at IAM and SPEEA.
What are the salient differences between sectors in these places? First, the pattern of union-employer dependence shapes the menu of possible policies.
Workers and unions at Boeing and Airbus are highly dependent on a single transnational firm, because finding a job as an aerospace mechanic or engineer in the adjacent region at the same pay level is difficult, and because the unions have limited presence outside of these employers. Their counterparts in he^th care and construction, by contrast, organize broadly across industries, and there fore have much less of an existential fear of job losses. These unions lack the in tense pressure seen at Airbus and Boeing to sacrifice the environment, public funds, and welfare benefits in exchange for jobs.
Second, mobilizations of actors outside of the labor-management relationship have set up opportunities for unions (although in the high-stakes races for in vestment seen at Airbus and Boeing, the opportunities have come with clear disadvantages). When jobs are threatened by an interregional competition for in vestment, local politicians and business representatives gave worker representa tives an additional set of resources to fight for jobs. Health-care and construction organizers, similarly, deal with competition with the help of community allies.
The difference is the quality of the partners and their interests. Oppositional po litical parties, community organizations, and other partners, with their wider range of interests, can help unions reach beyond the goal of job retention.
These patterns of union-firm dependence and broader mobilizations of busi ness, government, and civil society explain the menu o f options that are available for local political participation in economic development policy, in Seattle, Ham burg, and possibly beyond. Whether a union seizes opportunities, however, is a matter of strategic choice and cannot be read from the political-economic factors highlighted here. Political economy cannot tell us whether other leaders in the same circumstances would have made the same decisions as Rose or Judd.
Union-inclusive coalition building can emerge in cities that vary by size, eco nomic well-being, labor history, culture, and country. These coalitions, however progressive, do not usually reverse trends of declining union density, certainly not
